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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FROM GOBLINS TO GRAVEYARDS: THE
PROBLEM OF PATERNALISM IN COMPELLED PERCEPTION1
ABSTRACTS
Advances in technology have enabled the government to convey its
moral judgments in novel and emotionally powerful ways. The FDA’s
recently promulgated graphic tobacco warning labels are one such
instance of this development; state statutes that mandate sonograms for
abortion-seekers are another. Taking this strategy even further, it is
conceivable that the government, under the guise of informed consent—
and facilitated by data-mining and psychological methodology—could
effect a profound change on American decision-making.
This Note argues that when the government forces Americans to
perceive emotionally manipulative messages the resulting infringement
on freedom of thought violates the First Amendment. It further
demonstrates that, even in the cases of graphic labels and mandatory
sonograms, there is inadequate First Amendment protection for the
person compelled to perceive the message. Thus, this Note proposes a
test with which courts could determine when the government’s nonrational compelled message must be limited in order to safeguard
personal First Amendment rights. Such messages trample autonomy,
derogate dignity, cast aside freedom of thought and belief, and are thus
completely anathema to First Amendment principles. As such, courts
must recognize a First Amendment right against non-rational
government compelled perception.

1. This Note employs the term “compelled perception” in order to include all types of
propounded messages, but is mindful of the more commonly suggested term, “compelled
listening.” See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 940 (2009).
This Note does not advocate that no one should be forced to perceive any message by
any party. Instead, it argues that the government may not force private Americans to perceive
“non-rational” messages. See Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 367, 368-69 (2010) (defining non-rational information as generally
playing to emotions rather than logic). While Sarabyn would limit all non-rational
governmental speech, id., this Note advocates that only compelled non-rational governmental
speech must be limited under the right against compelled perception. See infra Part IV.A.
205
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INTRODUCTION: FORSTER’S GOBLINS
AND the goblins—they had not really been there at all? They were
only the phantoms of cowardice and unbelief? One healthy human
impulse would dispel them? Men like the Wilcoxes, or ex-President
Roosevelt, would say yes. Beethoven knew better. The goblins
really had been there. They might return—and they did. It was as if
the splendour of life might boil over and waste to steam and froth.
In its dissolution one heard the terrible, ominous note, and a goblin,
with increased malignity, walked quietly over the universe from end
to end. Panic and emptiness! Panic and emptiness! Even the
flaming ramparts of the world might fall.
Beethoven chose to make all right in the end. He built the ramparts
up. He blew with his mouth for the second time, and again the
goblins were scattered. He brought back the gusts of splendour, the
heroism, the youth, the magnificence of life and of death, and, amid
vast roarings of a superhuman joy, he led his Fifth Symphony to its
conclusion. But the goblins were there. They could return. He had
said so bravely, and that is why one can trust Beethoven when he
2
says other things.

Forster’s goblins, the manifestations of personal demons, creep up
from time to time—extant in the night hours of the psyche, extinguished
in day. The State seeks to employ these goblins as tools for
paternalistically manipulating Americans’ decision-making processes.3
These goblins might be gruesome images or harrowing noises so long as
the end result is a reduction in unpopular behavior.4 However, “[t]hose
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating the dissenters;” accordingly, government compelled
perception of Forster’s goblins “achieves only the unanimity of the
2. E.M. FORSTER, HOWARDS END 34 (Vintage Books 1989). One of the major themes
of Forster’s works is the short step between the “splendour of life” and “panic and emptiness.”
Id. His “goblins” bridge that gap, and are similarly employed in this Note in reference to the
government’s use of personal demons to paternalistically manipulate decisions by evoking
“panic and emptiness.”
3. See infra Appendix (proposed cigarette warning labels); see also infra Part II
(explaining how and why the tobacco warning labels were conceived in order to manipulate
emotions).
4. See infra Part III (explaining how and why certain abortion legislation has been
enacted to dissuade abortion-seekers). “[T]he purpose of the ultrasound requirement was to
reduce the number of abortions.” Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced
Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 365
(2009) (paraphrasing a phone conversation with Oklahoma state Senator Todd Lamb, a
proponent of one of three state regulations forcing sonograms for those seeking abortions); see
infra notes 7-10 (discussing the posture of Oklahoma, North Carolina, and Texas sonogram
regulations). See generally infra Part III.
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graveyard.”5
This Note argues that the State’s power to enlist these nightdwelling goblins to modify individual behavior must be limited. In
support, it will examine the problem, critique present strategies,
advocate recognizing a right against government-compelled perception,
and propose a test for implementing that right. This would ensure that
Americans are left to listen to Beethoven’s Fifth, or their fetus’s
heartbeats—to see the potential effects of their smoking, or any other
personal “goblins”—to perceive their joys and their demons, on their
own terms.6
Although questions of governmental control are best left to political
philosophy, the issue has already been thrust upon the legal realm.7
States have passed legislation to force abortion-seekers to perceive their
fetus as a prerequisite to an abortion, mandating sonograms and
amplifying any fetal sounds.8 These restrictions have yet to make their
way through federal courts.9 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed an
5. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). Justice Jackson,
who wrote the majority opinion in Barnette, was a strong defender of the freedom of belief,
and several of his opinions are referenced in this Note.
6. This right would strictly be a right against the State. Other Americans retain the right
to express most profane ideas while the listener is charged with avoiding the situation. See,
e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (holding that the plaintiff, who, while in
a courthouse, wore a jacket displaying a “scurrilous epithet” was within his First Amendment
rights, that people offended by the language could simply “avert[] their eyes,” and noting that
“[a]ny broader view of this authority [to curtail speech] would effectively empower a majority
to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.”).
7. See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST.
(February 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (providing the
current status of state ultrasound laws and noting that six states require a sonogram with the
patient’s ability to opt out, and that two state laws requiring mandatory viewing of sonograms
are the subject of legal disputes); see also Corbin, supra note 1, at 940 (introducing the topic
by inquiring whether “the state [may] compel smokers to watch a video about the dangers of
smoking before they purchase cigarettes” and whether “laws [may] force women who want to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy to hear the state’s position on when life begins”).
8. See, e.g., Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 405 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.80 et seq.) (providing in § 21.85 that, pursuant to informed consent
aims, a physician must perform an ultrasound, or real-time viewing, and relay the information
to the patient. However, “[n]othing in [§ 21.85] shall be construed to prevent a pregnant
woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to hear the
simultaneous explanation and medical description.”).
9. See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (granting a
preliminary injunction as the physicians’ compelled speech is unlikely to pass the strict
scrutiny standard, which will likely be applied); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. CV-2010533, 2012 WL 1034022 (Okla. Cnty. Dist. Ct. March 28, 2012) (permanently enjoining the
sonogram law); Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, No. CV-2010-533, 2011 WL 6442261
(Okla. Cnty. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2010), aff’d, 233 P.3d 380, 380 (Okla. 2010) (struck down for
procedural violations).
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injunction against similar abortion requirements.10
Meanwhile, federal lawmakers have required cigarette
manufacturers to include graphic imagery on warning labels.11 This, too,
is being litigated and has been enjoined.12 Surprisingly, neither
litigation—the warning labels nor the sonograms—take the viewers’
rights into account. This is because, as of yet, the viewers—who are
otherwise empowered to say,13 believe,14 and publish15 nearly whatever
they wish—have no recognized right to be free from the government’s
compelled message.16
Consequently, this Note aims to help recognize a right against
compelled perception solely against the government, and solely when
the government uses personal goblins to influence decision making.17 At
the outset, it is clear that there must be some point at which the
government, in expressing itself, engages in over-persuasion.18
10. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d
942, 959 (W.D.Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012). The Texas
statute, which compelled both sonogram viewing and heartbeat listening for abortion-seekers,
was enjoined by the lower court for vagueness and compelled speech on the part of the
physician. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding no vagueness, and holding that
the compelled perception was truthful and factual enough to pass constitutional muster. The
Texas law is currently in force.
11. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36628-01, 36628, 36704 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
12. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir.
2012) (ruling that the graphic warning labels pass rational basis review, but striking down
other sections of the Act); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F.
Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2011) (ruling that the graphic warning labels are unlikely to survive
strict scrutiny review).
13. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218-19 (2011) (permitting a religious
group to picket a military funeral for political purposes).
14. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (“For at the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that
in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than
coerced by the State.”).
15. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (holding a city cannot require
licenses for distributing religious publications).
16. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of the
Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 969 (1953) (“It would be an awkward, stumbling
job to try to explain to a well-disposed foreign visitor that [compelled perception] is not just
‘perfectly legal’ but fully consonant with those of our aspirations and practices of which we
are proudest before the world.”).
17. This problem has been previously recognized. See, e.g., id. But the limited
response suggested in this Note is unique and perhaps more realistic than an across-the-board
right against ‘compelled listening.’ Cf. Corbin supra note 1, at 939 (advocating that a right
against compelled listening, like a right against compelled speaking, is implicit in the First
Amendment).
18. The government of a free country could not, for example, force voters to watch
propaganda films before they are permitted to vote.
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Correspondingly, there must be some point at which a passive listener
has a First Amendment right to escape a forced conversation from the
government. This Note presumes that those two situations overlap in a
First Amendment right that has heretofore been unrecognized, and this
Note will proceed under the assumption that such a right exists.
Accordingly, Part I endeavors to define the scope and limitations of
government persuasion and concludes that the limitations are at best
undefined. Having so concluded, Parts II and III utilize the timely issues
of graphic tobacco warning labels and forced sonograms for abortionseekers to illustrate the lack of a reliable safeguard for private people
with respect to the government. Part II explains why the commercial
speech doctrine does not necessarily protect the perceiver from nonrational governmental speech. And Part III demonstrates why neither
the compelled speech doctrine nor the undue burden restriction can be
counted on to protect the private person from an unwanted, non-rational
governmental message. Having determined that (a) the government’s
powers of persuasion are limitable and that (b) the private person
subjected to those persuasive powers is not necessarily protected by any
recognized doctrine, Part IV calls for the recognition of a right against
non-rational government-compelled perception. Part IV goes on to
define that right, propose a test to determine when the right is
implicated, and explain why the right is supported from liberty, legal,
ethical, and moral perspectives. This Note concludes that the right
against government-compelled perception should be recognized for the
good of the individual, for the good of society, and to support and
enhance the purposes of the First Amendment.
I.

ON PATERNALISM: THE GHOSTS OF WILLINGBORO AND OTHER
SKELETONS IN THE GOVERNMENT’S CLOSET

This Part attempts to define the constitutional policy for
government persuasion. As a preliminary matter, government speech
can currently be described as limitless.19 Presumably the government is
empowered to express itself in order to carry out powers it has been

19. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009) (“A
government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself’ . . . say what it wishes . . . and to select the
views that it wants to express.”) (citing Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); see infra note 182 for a
discussion on the applicability of the government speech doctrine to this Note; see also
Sarabyn, supra note 1, at 397-99 (concluding that the government is empowered to speak
persuasively, even in the voting booth).
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granted via the Constitution.20
Indeed, government-sponsored public service announcements21 and
even state-adopted religious monuments22 demonstrate that the
government’s free expression powers may as well be plenary.
Moreover, there is no constitutional provision that prohibits the
government from being deceptive.23 While no specific limit has been
placed on the government’s ability to promulgate its ideas,24 the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue of the government compelling
(forcing) people to perceive its views.25 Accordingly, this Part seeks to
derive the limitations on government-compelled perception by first
probing the history of modern government expression, and then
extrapolating the probable limits on that expression when applied to the
forced perceiver’s rights.
A. The Origin of Modern Governmental Expression
The right against government-compelled perception cannot exist if
the government has limitless powers of persuasion. If the government
has limits on its persuasion powers, those limits should be evident in
cases where personal autonomy is infringed upon by the State. As the
fountainhead of freedom, the First Amendment has been interpreted to
20. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress with the powers necessary to
“establish,” “provide,” “define,” and “declare” in certain circumstances).
21. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562-63 (2005) (permitting the
government to anonymously advertise for the beef industry).
22. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467.
23. See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 234 (1992) (“The Constitution is hardly concerned with the
government lying, and few have argued that you have a constitutional right to have the
government refrain from lying to you.”).
24. One could speculate that “surely the government could not say x,” but the counterargument is that surely the government wouldn’t, or would otherwise subject itself to the
whims of angry voters. The idea of government speech accountability is the province of the
government speech doctrine, as discussed infra note 1852.
But such accountability cannot alone forestall the government from emotionally
manipulating Americans with compelled perception because the electorate could (and does)
normalize such behavior. Id. Moreover, the minority cannot vote down the message forced
upon them, nor can even the majority vote down the method of forcing that message, since a
right against government-compelled perception is currently unrecognized.
25. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 711 (Vintage
Books 1970) (noting that “[i]t has fortunately not been necessary to define the exact contours
of the principle that the government may not engage in expression directed at a captive
audience, or otherwise force its citizens to listen”). But consider Meiklejohn’s maxim in this
context: “If We, the People are to be controlled, then We, the People must do the controlling.”
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 16 (Harper & Brothers, 1960) (1948). A tension arises regarding how much “we the
people” can control while still retaining individual autonomy.
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deal with this issue.26 Thus the primordial limits of government
persuasion in the free speech context must be explored and understood.
Persuasive government speech is a direct effect of anti-paternalistic
jurisprudence.27 Although it could not paternalistically prohibit certain
speech, the government was permitted, and even encouraged, to adopt an
information-providing strategy to persuade Americans.28 The Supreme
Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. stated:
There is . . . an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach [of
withholding information]. That alternative is to assume that this
information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication

26. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining
that the government is not in the business of making decisions for private citizens because
“[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a
guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion,” therefore
“every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any
government to separate the true from the false for us”).
At this point, a note on First Amendment scholarship is in order, since not all agree with
Justice Jackson regarding “the very purpose” of the First Amendment—or at least with the
purpose behind that purpose. While some feel that the goal of the First Amendment is to
further a quest for the truth, see, e.g., infra note 27, others argue that the goal is strictly selfrealization, see Redish, infra note 137, and still others believe the goal is strictly to further the
aims of democracy, see, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25. This Note does not adopt nor does
it disavow any of these well-respected theories, but it utilizes them somewhat
indiscriminately. It also relies on Strauss’ “autonomy” theory, discussed infra note 189 and
accompanying text, and on Professor Smith’s “believing person” theory discussed infra Part
IV.C. At any rate, a right against non-rational government-compelled perception would
further any and all of the foregoing theories of First Amendment jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, a full epistemological survey of arguments for and against the right against
compelled perception within and without these theories is well beyond the scope of this Note,
which is limited to showing why the right is needed and why it should be adopted.
27. The process of spurning paternalism in free speech situations began in the early
twentieth century:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment,
as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). But antipaternalism did not yield an information-providing strategy until some fifty years later. See
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
28. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 at 748, 767. Specifically, Virginia had
attempted to prohibit advertising drug prices as it projected that the ensuing price competition
would drive small pharmacies out of business. Id.
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rather than to close them.

This information-providing theory was further developed in
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, in which the Court struck down
a ban on posting “For Sale” or “Sold” signs on lawns in the town of
Willingboro, New Jersey.30 The municipal ordinance was enacted to
curb “white flight,” caused by the obsolescent inference that as houses
went on the market, the number of minorities in town would rise, and
average housing values would decline.31 Importantly, in striking this
ordinance down, the Court suggested an alternative, stating “[t]he
township obviously remains free to continue ‘the process of education’ it
has already begun.”32 Willingboro could distribute information as to
which homes were not for sale, which residents were planning on
staying, and whatever other truthful information would keep residents
from panicking.33 Thus, the Court invalidated an information-hiding
ordinance, but would have permitted “an information-providing strategy
to accomplish the same end.”34
Therefore, the government can strategically coerce public
perception of certain ideas in order to accomplish legitimate ends,
effectively shouting over competing ideologies. However, there is
currently no recognized limit to this information-providing strategy.
Indeed, the government may be empowered to force cigarette smokers to
view disturbing images, and might force abortion-seekers to view
sonograms, so long as no other rights are being violated in the
transaction.35 Accordingly, citizens are currently deprived of their right
against compelled perception in order for the government to get its point
across. In effect, modern jurisprudence, in defending the First

29. Id. at 770. The opinion also explained that if such paternalistic regulations were
allowed, then states could regulate any kind of speech that could plausibly cause citizens to
behave irrationally. Id.
30. 431 U.S. 85, 86 (1977).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 97. The Court was quoting Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney: “If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an
emergency can justify repression.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
33. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 85, 97.
34. Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 596 (2004).
35. See, e.g., Tex, Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570
(5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Constitution permits the state to force a woman to view her
sonogram before she may have an abortion, and interpreting a sonogram to be solely truthful,
non-misleading information as far as the constitutional analysis is concerned).
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Amendment by eschewing paternalism, has set the stage for laws and
regulations that are increasingly paternalistic.
B. The Limits of the Government’s Information-Providing Strategy
This section will explore the confusing landscape of government
speech in order to determine the currently recognized constitutional
limits of the Linmark information-providing strategy. In particular, this
section will illustrate conflicting policies regarding not only the process,
but also the substance of persuasion from a listener’s perspective.
The government surely cannot coerce private speech. Both
compulsion and prohibition, as speech regulations, abridge speech—
running afoul of the First Amendment.36 In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, holding that a student could not be forced to
salute the flag, Justice Jackson opined:
[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
37
us.

The government thus cannot compel private speech in order to
promote its ideology.38
However, the government can impel ideas.39 For example,
according to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, a regulation requiring abortion-seekers to receive an informed
consent booklet is constitutional.40 The surgeon general’s warning on
tobacco products went unchallenged by the tobacco industry.41 And the
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). See Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-80
(1963) (interpreting Barnette to implicate an implied Freedom of Belief in the First
Amendment and concluding that this freedom must be wholly protected from State coercion
since it is the “equivalent of expression”); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717
(1977) (“[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable
to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message.”).
38. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 (1977).
39. See supra Part I.A.
40. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
41. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40
n.4 (D.D.C. 2011). Actually, the original warning labels were the result of a mutually
beneficial deal, which excepted the tobacco industry from advertising restrictions. Sylvia A.
Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 914 (1992). “The New
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government is free to promulgate posters expressing the belief that drug
use is morally wrong.42 In fact, the government could take its War on
Drugs much further, erecting billboards that attack the patriotism of potsmokers, the morality of meth-heads, and the audacity of alcoholics. In
like manner, the government could enlist gruesome images of addicts,
Forster’s goblins, and put them out in the public view.43
Many scholars believe Barnette expressly states an implied First
Amendment right, but they disagree as to the extent of that right.44 At
the very least, the case holds that the First Amendment prohibits outright
compelled speech.45 But any application of Barnette toward a greater
First Amendment right of freedom from governmental coercive speech46
or freedom from government-imposed forced listening47 is nebulous at
best.48 Thus, the true meaning of Barnette is awash with speculation.49
At any rate, the Court has laid out different policies in Linmark and
Barnette on the process by which the listener may or may not be

York Times characterized the law as ‘a shocking piece of special-interest legislation . . . to
protect the economic health of the tobacco industry by freeing it of proper regulation.” Id.
42. One poster depicting a confident adolescent from 2000 reads:
filed under: Pothead
kids these days are just
a bunch of pot-smoking slackers, right?
Wrong. I’m a writer, a halfback,
and the last thing I smoked
was an entire defense.
Drugs aren’t me. My life. My decision.
Anti-Drug Poster, available at http://findings.org.uk/images/pothead.gif (last visited May 13,
2013). The message between the lines is clear: being a pothead is just wrong.
43. To be fair, most government-compelled ideas are relatively benign. For example,
government expression cajoling citizens to vote, participate in the census, and find a
designated driver not only enhances the public welfare, but, more importantly, is not forced
upon the listener. But it seems there was a line that either political or private conscience
had—up until the sonogram and warning label regulations—refused to cross.
44. See Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson’s Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court
Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817, 821-24 (1986)
(describing the overall ambiguity of the meaning of the Barnette holding outside of the flag
salute context).
45. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 642, 642 (1943). See also Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that forcing New Hampshire drivers to display
a license plate with the State’s “Live Free or Die” motto is unconstitutionally compelled
speech).
46. See generally Sarabyn, supra note 1, at 367.
47. See generally Corbin, supra note 1, at 977.
48. See Harpaz, supra note 44, at 824 n.33 (and sources cited) (explaining how taking
Barnette to support an autonomous or self-realizing right may be beyond the scope of the
holding).
49. See, e.g., Sarabyn, supra note 1, at 367.
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persuaded. Although Linmark is a commercial speech case and Barnette
is arguably only applicable to flag salutes, the two are useful for the
effects they have on the listener. They require no inferential step:
Linmark adopts a policy of informing the listener in order to persuade;
Barnette—at the very least—adopts a policy of restraint from overt
coercion. By recognizing the listener’s rights in these cases, the Court
can resolve this conflict.
Similarly, a conflict exists in the substance of government
persuasion, from the listener’s perspective. In Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Court upheld a ban on
gambling advertising.50 Even though gambling was legal in Puerto Rico,
the Court reasoned that the territory had a “substantial interest” in
curbing the vice.51 Thus, since Puerto Rico had the power to prohibit
gambling, the Court decided the territory was empowered to ban speech
about that activity.52
In Stanley v. Georgia, however, the Court worried about the
influence of the government, noting, “[w]e are not certain that
[protecting citizens’ minds from obscenity] amounts to anything more
than the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content
of a person’s thoughts.”53 The Court went on to state that “[t]o some,
[controlling moral content] may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly
inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment.”54 This is
inconsistent with Posadas, in which the Court held that the First
Amendment is not strong enough to stop Congress from enacting
“intermediate” measures (in lieu of outright prohibition) to discourage
legal vices.55 Unfortunately, the Court has not yet resolved the tension
between cases striking down the means and ends of societal persuasion
like Barnette and Stanley with cases upholding the means and ends of
societal persuasion like Linmark and Posadas.56
50. 478 U.S. 328, 331 (1986).
51. Id. at 341.
52. Id. at 346 (“[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale
prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less
intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on
advertising.”).
53. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
54. Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (reasoning
that the Court would not ban virtual child pornography on the theory that it “whets the
appetites of pedophiles,” since such reasoning amounts to mind control).
55. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346.
56. One Justice explained that the Court presumes that information-providing laws are
the better alternative. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 804
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is safer to assume that the people are smart enough to get
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Thus, it appears that the limits of government expression with
respect to the rights of the listener are heretofore undefined. While no
Supreme Court majority57 has recognized the right against compelled
perception outside of the private home,58 a haze of uncertainty is perhaps
the next best thing. This indicates that there is space between Linmark
and Posadas, and Barnette and Stanley, where governmental powers of
persuasion, with respect to the listener, are questionable. Although
governmental expression is not expressly limited, the First Amendment
is conflicted on the issue.
II.

THE TOBACCO WARNING LABEL REGULATIONS59

First, this Part will explain the history of the warning label
regulations (which are attached in an Appendix and readily available
online) in order to provide an example of the government engineering
and employing Forster’s goblins as a means for controlling societal
behavior.60 Then, this Part will go on to review two cases61 that analyze
the warning labels, and it will conclude that the commercial speech
doctrine does not necessarily protect the private person from a forced
non-rational government message. As discussed in Part I, although
courts normally scrutinize these labels from the speaker’s perspective,
protecting the speaker’s First Amendment rights,62 the analysis does not
the information they need than to assume that the government is wise or impartial enough to
make the judgment for them.”). Justice Scalia’s statement is true enough, but he ignores the
reality of the government making the “judgment for them” through information-providing
laws.
57. Some dissents have queried whether ‘captive audiences’ must perceive
communication that they do not necessarily want to hear. See, e.g., Pub. Utils. Comm’n of
D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglass, J., dissenting).
58. Inversely, if speech occurs within the privacy of the listener’s home, the listener’s
right not to hear trumps the speaker’s right of free speech. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
485 (1988) (“There simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling
listener.”). Presumably this statement holds true against government speech as well.
59. See infra Appendix to examine the proposed warning labels. For an in-depth
analysis of the history of tobacco regulations as they relate to individual autonomy, see
generally Law, supra note 41, at 913-19, 924-43.
60. The astute reader might feel that tobacco warning labels are not exactly on point
because, while they are arguably non-rational, they are not necessarily forced on the private
person. However, since using tobacco is generally the result of an addiction, users are not
generally making a choice when they purchase tobacco products. Thus, they have no way of
“opting out” of the government’s non-rational message, except to “avert” their eyes like the
abortion-seekers discussed infra Part III.
61. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012);
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 268 (D.D.C.
2012).
62. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340
(2010) (holding that provisions that ensure speech is not misleading are to be reviewed under
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provide for the listener’s respective rights. Accordingly, rather than
analyze these requirements from a commercial speech view, this Part
will interpret them from the eye of the beholder.
A. Genesis of the Graphic Warning Labels
The proposed regulations were conceived through the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), which
empowered the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to impose
regulations for new graphic warning labels on cigarette packages.63 The
FDA evaluated the current cigarette warning labels and found them
inadequate.64 It first determined that the current warning label has
remained the same for the past twenty-five years.65 Secondly, the
current labels go unnoticed.66 Finally, the current labels are neither
relevant nor efficient.67
The FDA created thirty-six images and tested them to see which
had the greatest emotional impact.68 Survey administrators displayed
cigarette packages with graphic imagery to samples of each target
population, and also showed text-only cigarette packages to a control
group.69 The survey-takers were then asked questions to determine
whether particular images had any effect on their smoking beliefs.70 The

a reasonableness standard); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the S. Ct. of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 572 (1980) (holding that provisions that regulate otherwise protected
speech are to be reviewed under an intermediate standard to ensure that they are “no more
extensive than necessary”).
63. Ricardo Carvajal et al., The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act:
An Overview. 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 717, 730 (2009). This provision is one of “the most
contentious provisions of the FSPTCA.” Id. at 728.
64. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69524
(proposed Nov. 12, 2010).
65. Id. at 69529-30. The report also notes that the last change, in 1985, came about
when the FTC determined that the older warning “(1) [was] overexposed and worn out, (2)
lack[ed] novelty, (3) [was] too abstract, and (4) lack[ed] personal relevance.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
66. Id. The report cited a “major” Institute of Medicine study, determining that the
warnings are “both unnoticed and stale.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 69530-31. The report recognized that in Canada (which requires graphic
warning labels), 85% of smokers referred to packages as a source of smoking information; but
in the United States only 47% did. Id. The report also noted that the current American textual
warnings do not impose the perception of the risks involved in smoking. Id.
68. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 269
(D.D.C. 2012).
69. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36628-01, 36638 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
70. Id.

FERONY FINAL 51313.DOC

218

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:205

FDA used this data to measure four key metrics of image utility:
salience, recall, influence on beliefs, and behavioral changes.71 While
all four metrics measure persuasion to some effect, the study turned on
“salience.”72
The FDA defined “salience” as the “emotional and cognitive
responses to the cigarette packages and advertisements that bore health
warnings.”73 Two categories measured salience: the emotional reaction
and the cognitive reaction scale.74 The emotional reaction scale
measured “how the warning made the respondent feel, such as
‘depressed,’ ‘discouraged,’ and ‘afraid.’”75 Thus, the emotional effect
on survey-takers played a major role in determining the selection of a
particular image. And the end result of the FDA study was to select nine
images based almost entirely on their shocking impact. 76
71. Id.
72. The FDA explained that this “salience” measurement gauged the effectiveness of
the images better than other metrics. Id. at 36639. First, “research literature” indicated that
emotional reaction strongly correlated with risk aversion. Id. Second, the emotional response
could trigger a ‘bad feeling’ about smoking, so the consumer would be less likely to smoke.
Id. Third, the “salience” measurement yielded significant results compared with the
“behavioral change” and “influence on beliefs” statistics. Id. And revealingly, the FDA
expressed its belief that, compared with other expected long-term results, emotional responses
were more immediate, so they were the most telling statistic. Id.
The FDA also explained why it prioritized “salience” over “recall.” The “recall” portion
of the survey consisted of a one-week follow-up in which the FDA asked the respondents
questions about the warning-label survey. Id. The data from this study, however, did not
yield a useful result since most respondents remembered each image or text—not one more
than another. Id. The FDA reasoned that this was not an accurate assessment of the realworld situation of seeing the images over and over again. Id. More importantly, it decided
that “recall” is influenced by emotional response anyway, so “salience” was given priority.
Id. See also Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg.
69524, 69529 (proposed November 12, 2010) (noting that pack-a-day smokers could be
impacted by the graphical message more than 7,000 times per year).
73. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36628, 36638 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). Note that MerriamWebster defines “salience” as “a striking point or feature.” See Salience MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY 1097 (11th ed. 2003).
74. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36628, 36638 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
75. Id.
76. The chosen images are:
[C]olor images of a man exhaling cigarette smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his
throat; a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant receiving a kiss from his or
her mother; a pair of diseased lungs next to a pair of healthy lungs; a diseased mouth
afflicted with what appears to be cancerous lesions; a man breathing into an oxygen
mask; a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table, and featuring what appears to
be post-autopsy chest staples down the middle of his torso; a woman weeping
uncontrollably; and a man wearing a t-shirt that features a ‘no smoking’ symbol and
the words ‘I Quit’. An additional graphic image appears to be a stylized cartoon (as
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B. The Commercial Speech Factor
The two cases analyzing the warning label regulations cover the
commercial speech landscape nicely.77 In one case, the regulations were
upheld, since that court perceived them as mere disclosures that only
merit rational basis review under the commercial speech doctrine.78 The
other court struck the regulations down, deciding that they are compelled
protected speech that falls outside of the commercial speech doctrine,
and merits strict scrutiny like any other compelled speech case.79
However, while the cases are in conflict, they are in accord as far as the
private viewer’s rights are concerned.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco, upholding the
regulations, “vigorously disagree[d] with the underlying premise that a
disclosure that provokes a visceral response must fall outside [the lower,
disclosure, standard]’s ambit. Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke
an emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason,
but that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”80 And the
D.C. District Court in R.J. Reynolds, striking down the regulations,
provided an alternative: “the Government could disseminate its antismoking message itself . . . by increasing its anti-smoking
advertisements or issuing additional statements in the press urging
consumers to quit smoking or both.”81 Therefore, although the tobacco
warning regulations will be in litigation for the foreseeable future,82 all
courts agree that, one way or another, the government is free to make its
point.83
opposed to a staged photograph) of a premature baby in an incubator.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 268 (D.D.C.
2012) (citations omitted). The images are described accurately. However, to be clear, the
depictions are of actors, rather than actual injured or deceased people. Id. at n.8. See
Appendix to view the images.
77. See supra note 62 (providing a very brief overview of the commercial speech
standards of review).
78. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 564 (6th Cir.
2012).
79. R.J. Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 274-76. The compelled speech doctrine is
discussed more fully infra Part III.C.
80. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569.
81. R.J. Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276. The Reynolds court did note that the new
labels provide only “gruesome images designed to disgust the consumer.” Id. However, what
seems gruesome in one court can be interpreted as factual in another. See infra Part III.C.
82. United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (D.D.C. 2012)
(“It is perfectly clear from Defendants’ Response that the litigation challenging the
Regulations promulgated by the [FDA] . . . will not end (if ever) for an extremely long period
of time.”).
83. See R.J. Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 272; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 521.
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ABORTION POLITICS AND THE SONOGRAM LAWS

The politics involved in abortion regulations are included in this
Note to provide context for the sonogram laws discussed below. As in
the warning label regulations discussed in Part II, the motivations for the
anti-abortion regulations must be understood in order to balance them
against the woman’s right to be free from viewing graphic imagery.
Also, like the warning label regulation analysis, the current speech
safeguards are not enough to protect the rights of the listener—in either
the undue burden or compelled speech analyses. This Part concludes
that the government would manufacture—with the indispensable aid of
the woman herself84—Forster’s goblins, which the government would
use to shock abortion-seekers into conforming to governmental
ideology, and which would be unassailable from the constitutional
perspective of the listener.
A. Genesis of the Mandatory Sonogram Provisions
Abortion has been legal in the United States for nearly forty years.85
The pro-life faction galvanized as soon as Roe v. Wade was decided.86
One anti-abortion author explains:
By distorting the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court imposed a
law of abortion-on-demand in every state and county across the
country and empowered federal courts in every state to eliminate
abortion prohibitions or regulations that arguably conflict with Roe.
No matter how strongly public opinion may support abortion
prohibitions or regulations, the federal courts are empowered by Roe
to invalidate and sweep away that popular support, and they have
87
done so in hundreds of instances over the past 37 years.

While Roe held that women have the right to choose prior to the
viability of the fetus,88 that holding was substantially modified in the

84. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 351 (2008) (pointing out that the government forces
the woman “to use her body to produce the very information intended to dissuade her from
pursuing an abortion”).
85. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a constitutional
right to have an abortion prior to viability).
86. See Clarke D. Forsythe, The Road Map to Overturning Roe v. Wade: What Can the
States Do Now? in DEFENDING LIFE 2010: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR A PRO-LIFE AMERICA
33, 33 (Denise M. Burke ed., 5th ed. 2010) (explaining that many believe that surgical
abortion is “barbaric”) (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 34.
88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (stipulating that the state may regulate abortions in the second
trimester, and may “proscribe” them after viability).
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1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision.89 Correspondingly, the
Roe right has eroded in other legislative and judicial decisions.90 Several
2012 presidential candidates even signed a pledge to defund Planned
Parenthood and appoint only anti-abortion judges.91 Many state
governments are similarly poised to take legislative stands against
abortive procedures.92
Since Casey, states have been empowered to require that pregnant
women receive certain information before they may have an abortion.93
This “informed consent” strategy to reduce abortions has been widely
criticized,94 but has received strong political support in many states.95
89. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (holding that a
woman still retains the right to choose before viability, but the state may influence her
decision so long as it does not impose an “undue burden” on the woman).
90. See GLORIA FELDT WITH LAURA FRASER, THE WAR ON CHOICE: THE RIGHT-WING
ATTACK ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK 9-15 (2004). Feldt notes that in
1976, Congress passed the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited federal funding for abortion.
Feldt also points out that bills were subsequently passed requiring spousal consent (struck
down by Casey), a twenty-four hour waiting period, and “mandatory ‘counseling’ during
which [women] will be shown graphic anti-choice materials.” Id. at 10. See Forsythe, supra
note 86, at 34 (noting that in spite of Roe, “states have enacted legislation over the past three
decades that has limited the abortion license, reduced abortions, increased legal protection for
the unborn, and increased protection for women from the physical and psychological risks of
abortion”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164 (2007) (holding that banning a
late-term abortion procedure is not an undue burden on women seeking abortions in spite of a
lack of a health exception); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506, 521 (1989)
(modifying Roe to permit states to allocate funding to counseling women not to have abortions
based on the states’ “value judgment” on the point at which life begins).
91. Who Will Lead for Life in 2012?, S USAN B. A NTHONY L IST , http://www.sbalist.org/2012pledge (last visited May 13, 2013).
92. See John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain,
Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 330 (2011) (noting that,
as of the 2010 midterm elections, twenty-nine governors were pro-life and fifteen of those
states had a pro-life legislature).
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (specifically upholding the Pennsylvania regulation
requiring abortion-seekers to receive an informed consent booklet). See Informed Consent
Laws, DEFENDING LIFE 2010: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR A PRO-LIFE AMERICA, 85, 85
(Denise M. Burke ed., 5th ed. 2010) (“Twenty-four states require informed consent with a
one-day reflection period . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 84, at 360 (“[Informed consent] is harassment
masquerading as knowledge.”); Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How
Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1
(2012) (discussed infra Part IV.E). Cf. Part I.A, supra, discussing Linmark and the policy of
providing more information in order to persuade an audience to the proper choice.
95. Denise M. Burke, 2009 State Legislative Sessions in Review: Abortion &
Contraception, DEFENDING LIFE 2010: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR A PRO-LIFE AMERICA 53,
57 (Denise M. Burke, ed., 5th ed. 2010) (noting that in the 2009 legislative sessions, twelve
states considered requiring or modifying informed consent measures). See also Informed
Consent Regarding Ultrasound, DEFENDING LIFE 2010: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR A PROLIFE AMERICA 88, 88 (Denise M. Burke, ed., 5th ed. 2010) (“Eighteen states require women
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While many “informed consent” regulations are similar to the graphic
tobacco warning labels in motivation96 and in design,97 the most striking
examples are those that mandate the administering and viewing of
sonograms prior to receiving an abortion.98
Arguably, the Gonzales v. Carhart99 decision broadly enhanced the
informed consent powers vested in the states after Casey.100 Many
informed consent purposes echo the concerns of the Court in its opinion:
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well
informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her
choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow
more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once
did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and
vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child
101
assuming the human form.

This language has helped usher in scores of state abortion

receive information about the availability of ultrasound services prior to abortion or require
the performance of an ultrasound prior to abortion . . . .”).
96. See Mailee R. Smith, Informed Consent Laws: Protecting a Woman’s Right to
Know, DEFENDING LIFE 2010: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR A PRO-LIFE AMERICA 75, 83
(Denise M. Burke, ed., 5th ed. 2010) (explaining that informed consent laws are “an
expression of the state’s interest in the health and safety of women”). But see Robert M.
Godzeno, Note, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed Consent Legislation PostGonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 285, 300-01 (2009) (explaining that Casey
recognized the State’s interest in the fetus, as opposed to the woman herself, contrary to
earlier precedent).
97. See FELDT AND FRASER, supra note 90, at 157 (noting that most states utilize
“counseling materials” that “often include photographs and videos of fetuses at various stages
of development . . .”).
98. See Burke, supra note 95 at 57-58 (relating that in the 2009 legislative sessions,
twenty-two states considered ultrasound requirements, with Kansas and North Dakota
enacting laws requiring an abortion provider to offer a sonogram and chance to hear a
heartbeat); see also Godzeno, supra note 96, at 287 (2009) (categorizing sonogram laws into
three groups: those that do not require an ultrasound if the woman declines, those that require
an ultrasound but allow a woman to decline to view it, and those that require both the
ultrasound and displaying the image with permission for the woman to look away).
99. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
100. See generally Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and
Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 225 (2009) (discussing how
the Carhart opinion broadens informed consent powers and demeans the decision-making
ability of women); see also Godzeno, supra note 96, at 302 (explaining how Carhart’s
language broadens informed consent); accord Kaitlin Moredock, Note, “Ensuring So Grave a
Choice is Well Informed”: The Use of Abortion Informed Consent Laws to Promote State
Interests in Unborn Life, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1973, 1973 (2010).
101. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159-60. See AUL Model Legislation: Woman’s Right to
Know Act, DEFENDING LIFE 2010: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR A PRO-LIFE AMERICA 187, 187
(Denise M. Burke, ed., 5th ed. 2010).
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regulations mandating sonograms.102 In the past, the closer these
regulations came to forcing a woman to view personally emotional
imagery,103 the greater the certainty that the regulations would be struck
down by the courts.104 That is no longer the case.105
B. The Undue Burden Factor
Surely, one might argue, the woman already has a right against
compelled perception in this context. She has a right—a penumbral
privacy right—to have an abortion, and for nearly twenty years the Court
has maintained that as long as the fetus is not yet viable, no law may
stand as an undue burden between a woman and her choice.106 At the
same time, the State is empowered to employ regulations that respect life
and inform the woman, so long as she is able to choose abortion.107
It is unlikely, however, that any mandatory sonogram provision
would fail the undue burden analysis. The first part of the test requires
that the government have a legitimate interest,108 but courts have
reasoned that a mandatory sonogram and/or auscultation provision
constitutes truthful information that aids in deciding whether or not to
have an abortion.109 The Fifth Circuit has explained:
To belabor the obvious and conceded point, the required disclosures
of a sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions are
the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information. They are not
different in kind, although more graphic and scientifically up-todate, than the disclosures discussed in Casey—probable gestational
age of the fetus and printed material showing a baby’s general
prenatal development stages. Likewise, the relevance of these
disclosures to securing informed consent is sustained by Casey and
Gonzales, because both cases allow the state to regulate medical

102. Manian, supra note 100, at 261.
103. i.e. her own sonogram.
104. See supra notes 9, 10.
105. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572 (5th
Cir. 2012) (vacating a preliminary injunction, and moving the mandatory sonogram law
toward implementation before the case is heard on the merits in the lower court).
106. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“[A] statute
which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a
permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 834, 877.
109. See Robertson, supra note 92, at 350 (explaining that although mandatory
sonograms may serve other purposes, they concededly make the viewer more informed about
her choice).
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practice by deciding that information about fetal development is
110
“relevant” to a woman's decision-making.

Thus, Casey’s legitimate government purpose is met by any
imagery, no matter how emotional or powerful, so long as it is
information “relevant” to the woman’s decision making.111
The second part of Casey asks if the regulation results in an undue
burden upon the abortion-seeker,112 an unlikely result in this case. “[A]
willingness to impose unpleasant information on women contemplating
abortion is not the same as a purpose to prevent them from exercising
that right if that information is an inextricable part of a fully informed
decision to abort.”113 Thus, if a state forced an abortion seeker to view
the gruesome dismemberment depicted in the Carhart decision,114 such
an evocation would not violate the Casey standard.
C. The Compelled Speech Factor
In evaluating mandatory sonogram provisions, courts also look to
whether the doctor is being used as a governmental speaker, perhaps
violating his or her First Amendment rights.115 The government may
compel speech so long as it is truthful and non-ideological.116 Just as in
the commercial speech analogues of Zauderer and Central Hudson Gas
& Electric,117 a right against compelled speech usually protects the
listener from government ideologies.118 However, since mandatory
sonograms convey true information, it is difficult to argue that they are
strictly ideological—they do not force the doctor to say anything that is
not true. The Fifth Circuit examined this issue, reasoning that
‘ideologies’ reflect points of view, and that, since a photograph (like a
sonogram) is the “purest conceivable expression of ‘factual
information,’” there is no unconstitutionally compelled ideological
110. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577.
111. Id. at 576; see also Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s
Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV.
595, 646 (2012) (concluding that, under the Casey framework, the Texas and North Carolina
ultrasound provisions must be upheld).
112. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
113. Robertson, supra note 92, at 352.
114. See id. at 353 n.83.
115. See also supra Part II.B discussing compelled speech in the warning label context.
116. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding compelled speech also must be narrowly tailored to further a “compelling”
government interest); see also supra note 37.
117. See supra note 62; supra Part II.B.
118. This is because a ban on compelling ideological speech necessarily stops such
speech from reaching the compelled perceiver.
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speech.119
Even though the government must show that the compelled speech
is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest, it will
likely be able to pass a First Amendment challenge.120 It is easy enough
to demonstrate that the more information an abortion-seeker is given, the
better her choice will be, so any informed consent provision could be
narrowly tailored.121 Moreover, demonstrating a “compelling” interest
in the life of the unborn has never proved challenging for state
governments.122 Although many may disagree with these arguments,123
courts have adopted them,124 indicating that the right against compelled
speech does not necessarily protect the compelled listener.
IV. RECOGNIZING A RIGHT AGAINST NON-RATIONAL GOVERNMENTCOMPELLED PERCEPTION
This Note has determined that the public lacks protection from
compelled government perception. Either the current constitutional
safeguards must be strengthened, or a right against governmentcompelled perception should be recognized within the First Amendment.
This Note chooses the latter option,125 and this Part will demonstrate that
such a right is consonant with the First Amendment, and, indeed exists
unrecognized in First Amendment doctrine. First, this Part defines the
right and proposes a test to determine when the right is implicated.
Second, it explains why the right against government-compelled
119. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 n.4
(5th Cir. 2012).
120. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 733.
121. This argument succeeded in the Fifth Circuit, and there is no reason to believe that
it could not succeed in any court. Tex. Med. Providers, 667 F.3d at 577 n.4.
122. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
123. See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (finding that the
ends of a mandatory sonogram statute were not compelling since the presumed goal of the
provision was to protect a woman’s psychological well-being; the effect of forcing a woman
to see her sonogram would actually be quite counterproductive). Furthermore, even if the
provision was in furtherance of a compelling state end, there were other means available, such
as giving the information in writing, or offering the option to decline viewing. Id. See also
Robertson, supra note 92, at 357 (predicting that the First Amendment argument would be
better than the Casey undue burden standard, and that courts would find it difficult to uphold
any mandatory sonogram provision); supra Part II.B (discussing compelled speech in the
tobacco warning label context).
124. E.g., Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 n.4.
125. One could argue to the contrary that all other First Amendment safeguards, along
with the undue burden standard, should be strengthened to better protect the listener from
government ideologies. But it seems easier and more logical to recognize this hidden doctrine
for what it truly is: a right that protects the listener from unreasonable government-compelled
perception.
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perception is essential to protect the right to make free decisions, an
essential purpose of the First Amendment. Third, this Part argues that
any non-rational messages implicate the fundamental American right of
belief, a key priority of the First Amendment. Then, this Part goes on to
demonstrate how the right is evident in Supreme Court cases. Finally, it
explains, from ethical and moral perspectives, that failing to recognize
the right against government-compelled perception would espouse the
profane by utilizing Forster’s goblins—disavowing the sacred and
harming both the individual and society in general.
A. Defining the Right Against Compelled Perception
Unconstitutional compelled perception is implicated when the
government forces people to perceive non-rational messages.126 Nonrational messages are those that convey an emotional burden that
outweighs any logical benefit, where there are less emotionally
burdensome ways to provide the factual decision-making benefit.127 A
plaintiff would need to demonstrate that the forced message is more
emotionally burdensome than logically helpful in order to shift the
burden to the government. The government would then need to
demonstrate, using recent studies, that such measures are necessary to
fully inform perceivers of the choice they are about to make. Deciding
whether a message is more emotionally burdensome than logically
beneficial would be no easy task, but the test mirrors the “reasonable
observer” standard from Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc., (FAIR).128 Courts would ask whether a
reasonable person, under the targeted person’s circumstances, would
find that the message is more emotional than logical.129
126. See also supra note 1.
127. See Sarabyn, supra note 1, at 368-69 (defining “non-rational” information as
generally playing to emotions rather than logic); see also MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 63 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans.,1954) (“Both
lawmaking and lawfinding may be either rational or irrational.”).
128. 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006). That test asks whether a reasonable observer would see an
object or transaction as “expressive,” regardless of what the object actually expresses, in order
to determine whether it merits First Amendment protection. See Mark Tushnet, Art and the
First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 210-11 (2012) (finding the FAIR test an
“attractive” method for determining whether something merits First Amendment protection).
129. Concededly, reasonable courts could differ quite drastically on whether a message
is emotional or logical. See Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, A11-CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012), vacated in part, 667 F.3d
570 (5th Cir. 2012) (“As this Court reads the [Fifth Circuit] panel’s opinion, an extended
presentation, consisting of graphic images of aborted fetuses, and heartfelt testimonials about
the horrors of abortion, would be truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant.”) (quotations
omitted). Courts should thus consider factors such as: whether the message is, at first blush,
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For example, a rational informed consent provision might require
gun purchasers to sign a form acknowledging gun-related violence
statistics. However, an unconstitutional provision would require gun
purchasers to not only sign the form, but also to page through a dozen
gruesome images of fatalities.130 Such a provision would provide more
of an emotional burden than a rational benefit, and would therefore be
unconstitutional compelled perception.
Like unconstitutional compelled speech, unconstitutional compelled
perception invokes the First Amendment in order to keep the
marketplace of ideas free from undue government influence.131 But
unlike unconstitutional compelled speech, unconstitutional compelled
perception protects the viewer/listener in the transaction in addition to
protecting society as a whole. Furthermore, a right against compelled
perception provides a boundary line for informed-consent governmental
strategies of persuasion.132 So long as the right against compelled
listening is not implicated, the State may force citizens to perceive
messages in order to make a well-informed, free decision.133 But when
the right is violated, the State must desist, since logically it cannot
violate individual autonomy under the guise of anti-paternalism.134
Finally, this right is not violated when either the information is rational
or when the perceiver is able to opt out of the message.135

more likely to provide useful information, or more likely to shock the senses; whether an
otherwise well-informed reasonable person under the same circumstances would strongly
prefer not to perceive the message in question; and whether perceiving the message would
offend the sensibilities of the ordinary person under the circumstances.
130. Or perhaps pet-owners are forced to sign a consent form at the vet’s office
acknowledging the finality of the decision to put a sick, but curable, pet to sleep. While that
would be constitutional, a similar provision in which pet-owners must acknowledge the
decision’s finality, but must do so while being forced to hear Sarah McLachlan’s “Angel,”
would not pass the compelled perception test.
131. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (“[W]here the State’s interest is
to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh
an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”).
132. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the lack of a clear boundary for informed
consent provisions.
133. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (“[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed . . . .”).
134. Carpenter, supra note 34, at 650.
135. Thus, if the mandatory sonogram provisions allowed the woman to opt out of
viewing the sonogram, they would not implicate the right against compelled perception.
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B. On “Thought Control”: The Liberty Justification
The right against compelled perception would protect the
fundamental right to make a free choice.136 Throughout history, scholars
have recognized the necessity of active choice in the pursuit of personal
satisfaction,137 personal autonomy,138 and societal gain.139 The First
Amendment implicitly affirms this important right.140 The right to make
a free choice, though often not strong enough to deny an adversary’s free
speech right,141 is a powerful force against express governmental
coercion.142 Moreover, courts have even struck down paternalistic
136. While some theorists argue that “free choice” is an illusion, this Note—although
skeptical—refrains from addressing the issue, and instead adopts the position that even if free
choice is an illusion, it is a societal illusion worthy of protection. See KENT GREENFIELD,
THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A WORLD OF LIMITS 200 (Yale Univ.
Press 2011) (“But when we protect this sphere of human choice, we should not delude
ourselves that we are preserving a natural space where autonomous individuals revel in their
cognitive freedom. We should protect a sphere of human choice despite the fact it is a
constructed, contested space where choices are sometimes manipulated and manufactured.”).
Reduced to its essential elements, the modern state rests on the authority of law, and
law rests on the authority of personal choice. There are two kinds of public norms
in the modern state . . . . such norms are said to reflect “the will of the people,” as
expressed through their elected representatives or by officials appointed by them. In
addition, there are certain specially sacred norms—fundamental rights, whether
enshrined in a written Constitution, or treated as basic elements of a just social
order. These rights are the building blocks of a system of personal freedom.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 3940 (1990).
137. See WILLIAM BARRETT, IRRATIONAL MAN: A STUDY IN EXISTENTIAL
PHILOSOPHY 162-63 (Anchor Books 1962) (1958); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (arguing that the sole purpose of the First
Amendment is the goal of “self-realization,” a term that is inclusive of, yet distinct from,
personal autonomy).
138. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 434-35
(Lewis W. Beck trans., MacMillan Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1990) (1785) (positing the supreme
importance of human dignity); Emerson, supra note 37; FRIEDMAN, supra note 136, at 44
(quoting and discussing Joseph Raz).
139. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 12-13 (Albury Castell, ed., Crofts Classics
1989) (1859). Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 136, at 44-45 (discussing Michel Foucault’s
“nightmare vision of the ‘carceral society,’” wherein powerful judges of normalcy exercise
“pitiless” control, and determining that society to be “a terrible perversion of the right sort of
life”).
140. “The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from
assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech and
religion.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (Jackson, J. concurring).
141. See supra note 6.
142. See Sarabyn, supra note 1, at 400-02 (pointing out that private speech has been
limited, so government speech too must be at least similarly limited in similar circumstances:
“[T]he government has no First Amendment right to speak. When the government imposes its
ideological speech on a captive audience, the scale quickly tips in favor of the captive
audience’s right not to listen.”).
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censorship laws in favor of granting Americans true reign over their
autonomous decisions.143 In sum, a right against compelled perception,
like other First Amendment rights, exists in order to protect the liberty of
free decision-making.144
Political theorists have exalted the concept of liberty, which is only
possible when citizens have the right to a free decision.145 John Stuart
Mill’s treatise, On Liberty, is the seminal work on the subject. His main
thesis is that the only legitimate reason to deny personal liberty is to
prevent harm to others.146 He further points out that often, when
freedom is limited ostensibly to prevent harm, such a deprivation of
rights harms society more than the reason for the deprivation itself.147
Thus, the line of limited liberty should be drawn not where a person
causes harm to himself, but where he actually infringes on someone
else’s rights.148 It is therefore axiomatic that in a society where citizens
are truly free, there is no reason to limit freedom except where the
freedom of others could potentially be adversely circumscribed.149
Essential to this societal freedom is the liberty to make a free
choice. Mill describes this as “the privilege and proper condition of a
143. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (striking
down an ordinance prohibiting certain information as paternalistic, and instead suggesting that
the city campaign the information to paint an accurate picture for the discerning, autonomous
citizen); see generally supra Part I.A-B.
144. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson J., concurring).
This liberty was not protected because the forefathers expected its use would always
be agreeable to those in authority or that its exercise always would be wise,
temperate, or useful to society. As I read their intentions, this liberty was protected
because they knew of no other way by which free men could conduct representative
democracy.
Id.
145. See MILL, supra note 139.
146. Id. at 9. Scholars have also focused on Kantian theory in this respect. See
Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 169 (1997)
(discussing how Kantian autonomy, in which the purpose of government is to protect
individual autonomy, can be applied to American liberty, and noting that any speech that
limits the thoughts of another person must be limited under such a system).
147. MILL, supra note 139.
148. Id.
149. See id. In fact, Mill goes further, noting that society should tolerate de minimis
harm:
[W]ith regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury
which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific
duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except
himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of
the greater good of human freedom.
Id. at 82.
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human being, arrived at [by] the maturity of his faculties, to use and
interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part
of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances
and character.”150 Moreover, John Locke, in his Second Letter
Concerning Toleration, points out that, between individuals and their
government, the individuals have a greater interest in the consequences
of their actions, thus the best decision for society is one free from
governmental interference.151 Mill underscores this point, recognizing
that “[t]he human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in
making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes
no choice.”152 Likewise, the concept of liberty and the freedoms
codified in the First Amendment are rooted in the soil of free choice.153
A right against compelled perception must be recognized to protect
free decision making. The government forcing a person to perceive a
message categorically infringes upon that person’s freedom.154 This is
150. Id. at 57.
151. 5 JOHN LOCKE, A Second Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE IN NINE VOLUMES, (London: Rivington, 12th ed. 1824). available at:
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=764&chapter=8
0889&layout=html&Itemid=27.
Why should not the care of every man’s soul be left to himself, rather than the
magistrate? Is the magistrate like to be more concerned for it? Is the magistrate like
to take more care of it? Is the magistrate commonly more careful of his own, than
other men are of theirs . . . ? And ‘why may not the care of every man’s soul be left
to himself?’ . . . [The magistrate] never has the benefit of your sovereign remedy,
punishment, to make him consider; which you think so necessary, that you look on
it as a most dangerous state for men to be without it; and therefore tell us, ‘it is
every man’s true interest not to be left wholly to himself . . . .’
Id.
152. MILL, supra note 139, at 58.
153. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“First Amendment
freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its
laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom . . . .”); Wells,
supra 146, at 69-70 (discussing how Kantian autonomy, in which the purpose of government
is to protect individual autonomy, can be applied to American liberty, and noting that any
speech that limits the thoughts of another person must be limited under such a system); see
also Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409 (1986)
(noting that free speech is rooted in the protection of autonomy, which is essential for a free
society). See generally EMERSON, supra note 25, at 711 (arguing that it is essential that the
government withhold from forcing its views on a captive citizenry, and that such a “principal
is central to any system of freedom of expression”).
154. See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950) (Jackson,
J., dissenting in part):
While the Governments, State and Federal, have expansive powers to curtail action,
and some small powers to curtail speech or writing, I think neither has any power,
on any pretext, directly or indirectly to attempt foreclosure of any line of thought.
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because there is no such thing as an objective message, audio, visual, or
otherwise.155 A photograph, for example, unless it is accidental, is
created with some objective in mind.156 Susan Sontag wrote that
“[p]hotographs cannot create a moral position, but they can reinforce
one—and can help build a nascent one.”157 The moral position is thus
already inchoate in the mind, and the photograph is utilized to lure it out.
When the government compels perception in order to emotionally
influence a personal decision,158 personal autonomy is disenfranchised.
John Locke wrote that it is imperative that people in a society have the
right to choose.159 John Stuart Mill expanded on that theory, writing that
citizens must be able to say and do as they wish, so long as they do not
infringe on the rights of another.160 Therefore, government intrusion on
personal decision making results in an illegitimate abridgement of Mill’s
liberty.161

Our forefathers found the evils of free thinking more to be endured than the evils of
inquest or suppression. They gave the status of almost absolute individual rights to
the outward means of expressing belief. I cannot believe that they left open a way
for legislation to embarrass or impede the mere intellectual processes by which
those expressions of belief are examined and formulated. This is not only because
individual thinking presents no danger to society, but because thoughtful, bold and
independent minds are essential to wise and considered self-government.
Id.
155. “Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of
an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut
from mind to mind.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). See
also Journal of Henry David Thoreau, Journal, (6 May 1854), available at
http://www.walden.org/Library/Quotations/Observation (“There is no such thing as pure
objective observation. Your observation, to . . . be significant, must be subjective.”); see also,
GOETHE INST., Klaus Kinold—An Architect Photographs Architecture GOETHE INST.
(Translation: Ani Jinpa Lhamo trans.), http://www.goethe.de/kue/arc/pan/en4961638.htm (last
visited May 13, 2013) (noting that “[t]here is no such thing as objective photography”).
156. See SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 192 (Anchor Books 1990) (“Photography
is a system of visual editing. At bottom, it is a matter of surrounding with a frame a portion of
one’s cone of vision, while standing in the right place at the right time. Like chess, or writing,
it is a matter of choosing from among given possibilities, but in the case of photography the
number of possibilities is not finite but infinite.”) (quoting John Szarkowski).
157. Id. at 17. Sontag further explains that “[i]t is not reality that photographs make
immediately accessible, but images.” Id. at 165. The perception is not an experience of
reality, but an experience of the image as a separate concept.
158. E.g. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d
266, 271 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that the graphic cigarette warning labels include an image of
“a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table” and “a woman weeping uncontrollably”);
Appendix.
159. LOCKE, supra note 151.
160. MILL, supra note 139.
161. Other government intrusion is acceptable according to Mill’s Harm Principle. See
MILL, supra note 139.
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C. “With Increased Malignity”: The Belief-Based Justification
Recognizing a right against non-rational government-compelled
perception supports liberty and autonomy interests by protecting the
ability to make a free decision, and, insodoing, defends the fundamental
freedom of belief.162 Since the right to believe is protected (and perhaps
even the goal of)163 the First Amendment, and since any governmentally
compelled non-rational messages adulterate the freedom of belief,164 any
such messages must be anathema to the Constitution.
The right to believe is as much central to the First Amendment as it
is to being human.165 Indeed, without belief, “[w]e might purchase
quiescence by accepting a kind of creedal emptiness, thereby becoming
‘hollow men.’”166 And, if believing is so important to personhood, then
a proper “association of persons” must be one that “embraces ‘believing
persons.’”167 Given that proposition, one scholar ably quotes Madison,
“‘far from suppressing [divergences of the ‘opinions and passions’ of
persons] in the interest of civil peace we should recognize that ‘the
protection of these faculties is the first object of government.’”168
Additionally, the protected status of art and music demonstrates the
high value society places on belief-altering media, even when such
media contains no rational message.169 “Through the imagination, art
162. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (“Our cases have long recognized a
distinction between the freedom of individual belief, which is absolute . . . .”).
163. See generally Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The
Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233 (2002) (proposing that
First Amendment jurisprudence shift its focus to the ability to believe, a uniquely human
trait).
164. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 118 (1996).
A wide berth for both religion and art are essential to a free society. Governmental
funding of either, however, threatens the private sphere of freedom safeguarded by
the First Amendment. In a diverse society, the establishment of an official art is an
evil that should be avoided as assiduously as the establishment of an official
religion. Such establishment directly threatens the scope of power individuals can
exercise over their respective private spheres and therefore against the public
sphere.
Id.
165. Smith, supra note 163, at 1271-72 (“To some extent, who I am is determined by
what I believe.”); id. at 1278 (“Finally, and most crucially, it is in having and struggling to
live in accordance with beliefs about ultimate meaning or purpose . . . that persons achieve
their highest, most morally attractive stature.”).
166. Id. at 1281. See also supra note 5, and accompanying text.
167. Smith, supra note 163, at 1283.
168. Id. at 1285-86 (quoting The Federalist No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed. 1961)).
169. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (indicating that art by Jackson Pollock, music by Arnold Schöenberg, or poetry by
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evinces what purely didactic speech cannot—the ‘sensation’ of an
experience never had, a world never seen.”170 And “[m]usic can at once
foster a sense of community and maintain inner emotional privacy.
Indeed, it is precisely this dual characteristic that underpinned the strict
control of music in totalitarian states and must underpin music’s
protection under the First Amendment.”171 Art is “unquestionably”172
protected by the Constitution not because it engenders logical reasoning
and democratic debate, but because it offers an avenue to evolve and
understand personal and societal beliefs.173
When the government compels perception of a non-rational
message, it forces the private person to engage in a battle of beliefs: a
private ideology must be assessed as against a public ideology. Since
the government should be in the business of protecting private beliefs,
rather than manipulating them, any forced perception of these messages
per se violates the First Amendment. Thus, any informed consent
message that attempts to change a belief in a non-factual manner must be
unconstitutional. Indeed, if an informed-consent message conveys
solely emotion, the result is not informed, but rather the increased
malignity of manipulated consent.
D. “Freedom for the Thought We Hate”: The Jurisprudential
Justification174
Moreover, the Supreme Court has implicated a right against
compelled perception in its modern First Amendment jurisprudence. In
Barnette, the Court held that the government cannot compel ideological
speech, indicating that there is some personal right to be free from such

Lewis Carroll are “unquestionably” protected by the Constitution).
170. Hamilton, supra note 164, at 87.
171. David Munkittrick, Note, Music as Speech: A First Amendment Category unto
Itself, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 665, 679 (2010).
172. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
173. See Hamilton, supra note 164, at 87-88 (“Two phenomena occur simultaneously
within the participant’s experience of art: (1) the recognition of preexisting world views, and
(2) the act of . . . distancing of oneself from one’s assumptive world view. . . [together they]
create a reorientation experiment, the commitment-free experiencing of a perspective different
from one’s own.”).
174. Scholars have also argued that the right against compelled perception is a converse
corollary to the recognized right to listen within the First Amendment. See Corbin, supra note
1, at 940. Since the First Amendment creates a right to speak and a right not to be forced to
speak, it follows that a right to listen would be paired with a right not to listen. Id. Such an
analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, which argues that the right should exist solely
against the government because current safeguards are lacking and because the right would
serve liberty interests of the individual and society.
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intrusions.175 Some scholars have suggested that Barnette stands for
more than just a right not to be forced to speak ideologically.176 Justice
Jackson, who authored the Barnette majority opinion, has opined
voluminously on so-called ‘negative’ First Amendment rights.177 In fact,
in Barnette itself, Jackson even refers to the “individual freedom of
mind,” favorably contrasting it with restrictions within the totalitarian
regimes of the time.178 This sentiment, as supported by previous
Supreme Court justices,179 indicates that Barnette and cases like it180
protect more than just the right not to speak—they protect the right to
make a free decision.
A half-century after Barnette, in Hill v. Colorado, the Court held
that “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling
recipient.”181 Scholars have reasoned that since Hill permits states to
abridge private speech when the unwilling recipient’s interests are
violated, Hill must prohibit equally insidious governmental speech,
which does not share the same constitutional standing as private
speech.182 Barnette presents this idea from the speaker’s perspective,
175. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). See also Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (“[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate an
ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s
First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”).
176. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
177. GLENDON SCHUBERT, DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE JUDICIAL
OPINIONS OF ROBERT H. JACKSON 29 (1969).
178. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) overruled in
part by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 61 (1946) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]f there
is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other
it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought we hate.”). (emphasis added). Girouard specifically adopted Holmes’s
dissent, noting that “[f]reedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic
in a society of free men.” 328 U.S. at 69.
180. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
181. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000). But the Hill court was wary of
embracing a right not to be spoken to, explaining that the right is “more accurately
characterized as an ‘interest’ that States can choose to protect in certain situations.” Id. at 717
n.24. This has led other courts to hold that a person’s right to avoid a message may only serve
as a justification for states to abridge that message, and not as a right in and of itself. See, e.g.,
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (W.D.
Tex. 2011) vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
182. See supra note 142. It is important to note that the government is empowered to
say whatever it wishes. See Carl G. DeNigris, When Leviathan Speaks: Reining in the
Government-Speech Doctrine Through a New and Restrictive Approach, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
133, 134 (2010). But the government speech doctrine, while characterized by scholars as
“‘unprincipled,’ ‘nefarious,’ and the ‘ugly stepchild’ of First Amendment jurisprudence,” is
not directly implicated in this discussion. See David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online
Forums: First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government
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but the two cases, from a listener’s perspective, approach the same idea:
the government cannot compel a private person to perceive ideological,
or non-rational, messages.183 Informed consent, or information-sharing
regulations as promoted in Linmark,184 is permissible so long as it does
not infringe on this implied First Amendment right.
The government might argue that since it has the ability to ban
certain activities, it should have the ability to influence certain decisions
that could cause that activity.185 Moreover, courts have long held that
where a government has a legitimate interest, it cannot paternalistically
limit certain speech,186 but it may (paternalistically) promote certain
information.187 The government should indeed have some power to
promote its interests. If most people in a state do not want people to
smoke, those people may certainly vote for their tax money to pay for
anti-smoking campaigns.188 The line, however, must be drawn where
the government attempts to influence the specific “free” decision to
smoke by controlling the mind by way of the emotions.
In order to understand the reasonable limits of influence, it is
enlightening to imagine the extremes. One scholar has written an
interesting thought experiment regarding mind control:
Even if the government can forbid people from acting in certain
ways, it does not follow that it may try to prevent them from
believing that such actions are proper, or from wanting to engage in
those actions.
Suppose that the government could manipulate people’s minds
directly, by irradiating them in a way that changed their desires. No
one would say that the power to ban an activity automatically
included the “lesser” power to irradiate people so that they no longer
Websites, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1981, 1984 (2010) (citations omitted). Still in the early stages
of its development, the government speech doctrine is more concerned with political
accountability than with the permissible scope of government speech. Id. at 1985. There is
no question of political accountability in government-compelled emotional perception, so
further discussion on the government speech doctrine would be inapposite.
183. See also ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, & ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE xi (2012) (“The First
Amendment stands for the proposition that we are not the students of the state. We are adults
who are constitutionally empowered to speak for ourselves.”).
184. Linmark Assoc’s., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 88 (1977).
185. See Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 331 (1986);
supra Part I.C.
186. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
187. See Linmark, 431 U.S. at 88; supra Part I.C.
188. See supra note 182 (discussing the government speech doctrine and political
accountability).
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189

Clearly “irradiating” people to have certain beliefs is taking government
authority too far.190
The Supreme Court encountered an analogous situation during the
Cold War when union employees sued over being required to swear that
they were not communists and did not “believe,” inter alia, in political
strikes.191 While the majority upheld the law in question, Justice
Jackson voiced reservations in his partial dissent, reasoning that since
Congress had not prohibited political strikes, “the Court must be holding
that Congress may root out mere ideas which, even if acted upon, would
not result in crime. It is a strange paradox if one may be forbidden to
have an idea in mind that he is free to put into execution.”192
Scholars, too, have worried that failing to recognize a right against
compelled perception is inconsistent with both American principles and
general logic:
I tremble for the sanity of a society that talks, on the level of abstract
principle, of the precious integrity of the individual mind, and all the
while, on the level of concrete fact, forces the individual mind to
spend a good part of every day under bombardment with whatever
193
some crowd of promoters want to throw at it.

Indeed, recognizing this right would be not only sensible, but also
timely. Scholars have supported recognizing some kind of right against

189. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 334, 360 (1991).
190. See also Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations
and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1320 (1998). Heyman discusses
Kant’s formulation of human dignity, which would find such mind control morally
reprehensible.
As an autonomous being, on the other hand, man ‘is not to be valued merely as a
means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is,
he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth).’ This dignity not only forms the
basis of his own sense of self-esteem or self-respect, but also allows him to ‘exact[]
respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world.’
Id. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 434-35
(Lewis W. Beck trans., MacMillan Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1990). (1785)). See also Corbin,
supra note 1, at 972 (noting that scholars have recognized that “the freedom of thought is
really the only area where the individual is truly autonomous, and that this autonomy requires
that the state not invade the private domain of the mind.”).
191. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 385-86 (1950).
192. Id. at 438 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part).
193. Black supra note 16, at 962 (speaking in terms of advertisements and radio
programs on public buses, but voicing a more general complaint about the liberty at stake in
these transactions).
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compelled perception,194 usually within the First Amendment,195 but
until the mandatory sonogram and warning label regulations,196 such a
right was not entirely necessary.197 Although a cause of action for
violating a right against government-compelled perception has generally
not been feasible,198 the new regulations have ushered in creative new
complaints.199 In sum, the Supreme Court has implicitly supported the
right against government-compelled perception, and may soon have
occasion to comment more directly on the nature of that right.
E. “Unwelcome Words”: The Ethical Justification
Not only is non-rational government-compelled perception
offensive to societal liberty, it also offends societal ethics. Informed
consent measures are unethical when they provide immaterial or
irrelevant information, when they force information that people do not
wish to perceive, and when they manipulate the decision with an
emotional message.200
Providing immaterial information in the guise of informed consent
is unethical:
No law requires that heart surgery patients be told what will
happen to their bodies in graphic detail. The fact that the average
person would be disgusted and disturbed by a detailed description of
heart surgery does not warrant requiring such a description as a
condition of effective consent. On the contrary, most patients would
likely rather not hear the description because it would only increase
201
their anxiety about a procedure they know they must undergo.

194. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 1.
195. But sometimes as a more general privacy right. See supra notes 16 and 18; see
also Roe v. Wade discussed supra note 85 and accompanying text.
196. Discussed supra Parts II and III.
197. EMERSON, supra note 25, at 711 (“It has fortunately not been necessary to define
the exact contours of the principle that the government may not engage in expression directed
at a captive audience, or otherwise force its citizens to listen.”).
198. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942,
954 (W.D. Tex. 2011) vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining that although
the abortion-seeker’s right not to see her sonogram was perhaps implicated by the mandatory
provision, the dearth of case law precluded further analysis).
199. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs, Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. 2:12-CV-00395, 2012
WL 1034022 (Okla. Cnty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2012) (“[I]t is a logical corollary of the captive
audience doctrine that individuals have a right to be free from unwanted government speech in
private settings.”).
200. See generally Ian Vanderwalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased
Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, at 2
(2012).
201. Id. at 20.
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This analogy demonstrates how immaterial information can do little
to effect a rational decision—and can do much to cause an irrational one.
It would be absurd to force people who are going to need surgery
anyway to hear the gruesome details of the upcoming procedure, just as
it would be absurd to force people who attempt eating challenges to hear
the gruesome details about morbid obesity. These conversations add
nothing of substance to the decision, and only serve to scare the
decision-maker.202 But these conversations will occur between the
government and the decision-maker if the government is left unchecked.
Forcing people to see that which they do not wish to perceive is
also unethical. If the “primary objective” is informed consent, then,
quite simply, “patients should not be compelled to receive information
they do not want or to make decisions they do not wish to make.”203
Without opt-out provisions in the abortion and tobacco legislations, they,
strictly speaking, force people to perceive things that they do not wish to
perceive. This is akin to forcing a voter to watch a propaganda film in
order to “inform” him of which way to vote. Surely the film provides
information, but it also surely removes the possibility of a truly
independent decision. The recent plight of a Texas abortion-seeker is
striking:
‘I’m so sorry that I have to do this,’ the doctor told us, ‘but if I don’t,
I can lose my license.’ Before he could even start to describe our
baby, I began to sob until I could barely breathe. Somewhere, a
nurse cranked up the volume on a radio, allowing the inane
pronouncements of a DJ to dull the doctor’s voice. Still, despite the
noise I heard him. His unwelcome words echoed off sterile walls
while I, trapped on a bed, my feet in stirrups, twisted away from his
voice.
‘Here I see a well-developed diaphragm and here I see four
healthy chambers of the heart . . .’
I closed my eyes and waited for it to end, as one waits for the car to
204
stop rolling at the end of a terrible accident.

202. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain,
Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 351-52 (2011).
In the six days the Oklahoma law was in effect, all the patients at a Tulsa clinic
averted their eyes. The director of the clinic, which does 3000 abortions a year,
reported that ‘Not one patient would look at the screen and they all closed their eyes
or turned their heads . . . . But it’s hard to turn your ears off . . . . Several of the
patients were in tears afterwards. No one changed their mind.’
Id.
203. Vanderwalker, supra note 200, at 51.
204. Carolyn Jones, ‘We Have no Choice’: One Woman’s Ordeal with Texas’ New
Sonogram
Law
TEXAS
OBSERVER,
March
15,
2012,
available
at
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Finally, the very idea of manipulating people with emotional
messages in order to influence their decision making is unethical.
If [a strong emotional reaction is irresistible], it would cause [the
205
decision-maker] to fail the condition of noncontrol necessary for
autonomous action. This is because an individual who acts in accord
with an emotion that is irresistible does not make a choice at all.
Unlike being rationally persuaded of prudential or moral
considerations, an irresistible emotion unavoidably compels an
206
action and prevents the exercise of autonomy.

Utilizing emotional imagery in order to manipulate a particular reaction,
as the FDA did in creating its warning labels, cannot result in a betterinformed decision. Since this kind of manipulation will not make for a
more rational decision, it is an unethical practice.
F.

“A Country I Do Not Recognize”: The Moral Justification

Government-compelled perception strikes at the identity of the
individual it seeks to protect. The dissonance occurs in the following
manner: (1) when an individual is forced to adopt or adapt to offensive
messages; and (2) when the individual reflects upon the effect of his or
her identity’s unpopular re-categorization. Each event can be further
broken down into two offensive events: the moral clash with the
messages themselves, and the identity clash with the government’s
normative efforts. In practice, compelling citizens to perceive nonrational messages will result in social disharmony and a net moral
devaluation.
Opponents of the recognition of this right against compelled
perception (a limitation on the power of state and federal governments)
might suggest that the personal harm suffered is de minimis, thus the
societal harm is nonexistent.207 However, the effects of vivid media on
http://www.texasobserver.org/we-have-no-choice-one-womans-ordeal-with-texas-newsonogram-law/ (last visited May 13, 2013).
205. “[N]oncontrol means that actions are less than fully autonomous to the extent that
they are controlled by external factors, especially other people.” Vanderwalker, supra note
200, at 36.
206. Id. at 44.
207. They might also argue that Cohen v. California would dictate that women seeking
abortions can simply shield their eyes from the sonogram, as she must pay the price of
stepping out into society. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). That is, no
images are forced, they are merely the result of making the decision to leave the private home
and get an abortion in the public sphere. There are two problems with this argument. First,
Cohen dealt with private speech, which is constitutionally protected. See supra Part I.B. This
Note deals with governmental speech, which is not expressly protected. Thus, Cohen may not
have a direct application to this analysis.
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the human mind are hardly undeserving of legal attention.208 Henry
David Thoreau noted “the question is not what you look at, but what you
see.”209 The problem is not, for example, the image—it is the moral
position evoked by that image, resulting in the manipulation of a
citizen’s mind via emotion.210
1.

Private morality clashes with government morality

When the government forces a non-rational message, the individual
must adopt or adapt to the offensive messages.211 The first event is the
moral clash with the messages themselves. Some scholars believe that
the right to self-government should trump personal decisions, that is,
that society should dictate what is morally correct, and ‘autonomy’
should defer to that judgment.212 However, those same scholars gripe
about the loss of “sacred” values when liberty is chosen over moral
judgments.213 This author agrees that “sacred” values are important,

Second, regardless, Cohen would support recognizing this right since it protects the
unpopular minority. Cohen attacked the problem from the other end of the spectrum, and in
fact was maligned by scholars who argue that it lowers the level of discourse. See, e.g.,
R OBERT H. B ORK , Introduction, A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL ASSAULT
ON AMERICAN VALUES i, xxviii-xxix (Robert H. Bork, ed., 2005). Yet, Cohen stands for the
very essence of liberty—private expression in the public sphere. The regulations here would
curb that expression. Cohen, in fact, supported the expression because to hold otherwise
would “effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections.” Id. at 15. Thus, the purpose of Cohen was to protect the marketplace of ideas,
not to force ideas upon the unwilling.
208. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 683-710 (2012) (describing the current legal tools at hand
for interpreting images).
209. Henry David Thoreau, Journal, 5 August 1851, available at
http://www.walden.org/Library/Quotations/Observation.
210. See Tushnet, supra note 208, at 694 (“Images seem especially dangerous because
their power is irrational. [B]y bypassing reason and appealing directly to the senses, images
fail to participate in the marketplace of ideas.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
211. Rebelling probably would not be a successful option since the offended party is
likely in the extreme minority. Otherwise the political process would not have created the
offending regulation.
212. See GARY L. MCDOWELL, The Perverse Paradox of Privacy, A COUNTRY I DO
NOT RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES 57, 80 (Robert H. Bork, ed.,
2005) (“Constitutional self-government is not possible if the Supreme Court . . . assumes . . .
the power to declare invalid, based on the right to privacy, the state laws that seek to express
moral choices.”). That author would have held differently in Supreme Court cases that held
certain state bans on “immoral” acts unconstitutional, specifically Griswold, Roe, and
Lawrence v. Bowers. Id. at 74-76. But see Emerson, supra note 37, at 929 (“And it must be
remembered that the expression which needs protection is normally that which is the
unorthodox, the hated and the feared.”).
213. See R OBERT H. B ORK , Introduction to A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE: THE
LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES i, xxviii-xxix (Robert H. Bork, ed. 2005) (noting

FERONY FINAL 51313.DOC

2013]

5/15/13 2:44 PM

COMPELLED PERCEPTION

241

and, furthermore, that forcing people to view graphic images results in a
loss of sacred values and a decrease of morality.
Certain graphic images or music, or even the sound of nails on a
chalkboard, may be accessed at one’s liberty, but should never be forced
upon a person by the government, especially in order to influence a
particular decision. Utilizing this method to coerce a moral judgment
may inevitably cause the “goblins” to go unnoticed over time.214
Abortion-seekers could, in the aggregate, grow numb to the sight of a
sonogram,215 smokers could stop caring about images of cadavers. The
ante will need to be increased every few years, and the United States will
soon become the country that subjects its populace to the most amoral
“brutalization”216 in order to further its value judgments. Thus, the
effect of this conflict between private and governmental morality will be
an overall decline in net morality.217
2.

Private identity clashes with government authority

The second immediate moral problem caused by non-rational
government-compelled perception arises from the targeted individual’s
resulting personal identity reclassification. The unpopular individual is
being told by the government ‘you’re not paying attention, so I am going
to force you to listen.’218 This paternalism causes the individual to selfdefine as a bad person. Again, problems arise here both from the
message and the means of transmission.
One scholar explained the harm of the bad person message caused

that permitting freedom of expression often results in “the brutalization of the culture,” where
“words and images reduce everything to the same level”).
214. See supra notes 64, 65 (explaining that, over time, warning labels lose their shock
value).
215. That is to say, the ubiquity of ultrasound provisions could undermine their
personal shock value.
216. BORK, supra note 213.
217. The means of implanting this moral message also raise a conflict between the
private citizen and the government. The idea of having no choice but to be forced to see
offensive images will elicit resentment against the majority forcing its views. The result is a
step away from harmony, and a step toward acrimony. While the unpopular individual feels
on the same footing with the majority in the marketplace of ideas, this private dictation will
cause the individual to feel disenfranchised—and rightly so, for that is the net effect.
218. This message would not offend the right against compelled perception if it were
not forced. Thus the State’s interests in general welfare may still be satisfied so long as the
State does not actually force its very opinion upon the listener. Of course, in extreme
circumstances, the State is very much empowered to dictate to the individual, such as when
the private person is causing harm to other people. See MILL, supra note 139, (discussing
Mill’s Harm Principle, which dictates that a person’s liberty should not be violated unless it
would harm others).
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by sonogram images in her aptly titled article, Seeing is Believing.219
She cited a 1983 study on sonograms in which women were asked about
their feelings after seeing the images.220 One woman commented “I feel
that it is human. It belongs to me. I couldn’t have an abortion now.”221
Other factors indirectly influence the transaction.222 Sonographers or
obstetricians interpret the images with loving coos, “showing the baby”
with at best unintentional mannerisms.223 Perhaps posters of babies line
the walls, perhaps parenting books fill the shelves. These means of
transmission cause an identity shift from “righteous decision-maker” to
“bad person.” A woman must be struck by the clinical environment she
finds herself in—she must realize that the very fact that she is being
forced to view the image is telling her that she is making a bad choice
and may even be a bad person. One scholar refers to these feelings of
re-categorization as a “phenomenological wallop,” one capable of
powerful persuasion.224
The same feelings pervade any individual decision when it is
tainted by the influence of the State. A cigarette smoker who must view
a graphic image is now no longer a smoker, but also re-classified as a
potential cancer patient, heart attack victim, or cadaver.225 These new
beliefs are not necessarily untrue, and perhaps the smoker is more
informed, but, again, indirect forces are influencing the transaction. The
nature of the imagery, how bad it is made to look, its overall ubiquity,
the grave vocals in the public service announcement voiceover, and the
grave look on the convenience store clerk’s face all factor into what was
once a free decision.226 The cigarette smoker is no longer just a cigarette
smoker, or even a potential sick person. The cigarette smoker, like the
abortion seeker, has been transformed into a miscreant, someone who is
on the wrong side of society. The personal choice is no longer personal,

219. Sanger, supra note 84, at 351.
220. Id. at 365 n.59 (citing John C. Fletcher and March I. Evans, Maternal Bonding in
Early Fetal Ultrasound Examinations, 308 N EW E NG . J. M ED . 391 (1983)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 372.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 382.
225. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36
(D.D.C. 2011).
226. The FDA has been kind enough to permit any Internet user to view this
transformation. Navigate to “Interactive Store Counter Photo” on FDA.gov and use the left
and right arrows to watch a non-confrontational store counter transform into a counter beset
with personal goblins. Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/ucm259862
.htm (last visited May 13, 2013).
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nor is it a choice at all.
Compelled perception places the unwilling listener squarely in the
wrong. The abortion-seeker is categorized as psychologically unable to
make a sound decision.227 Or she is a deviant. The smoker chooses to
smoke, and is no longer a free decision-maker, but a miscreant. These
private citizens’ identities are re-classified as “bad,” “dumb,” or even
“evil.” Consequently, they are maddeningly aware of their political
disenfranchisement, and might be quite happy to decrease the level of
discourse. Worst of all, as discussed supra, the net result of this whole
exercise is a decrease in societal morality. Therefore, the pragmatic
social and psychological effects of these forced messages demand a right
against non-rational government-compelled perception.228
Naturally, or rather, unnaturally, the law seeks to approach these
problems rationally,229 but now that emotional means have been
successfully employed by the government under the guise of
rationality,230 courts must recognize the sanctity of the individual against
such measures by recognizing the right against non-rational governmentcompelled perception.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing a right against non-rational government-compelled
perception would call the constitutionality of the warning label and
mandatory sonogram regulations into question. It would ensure that the
government cannot employ Forster’s goblins to manipulate the
individual. Compelling this kind of perception is bad for society—it
decreases morality and disenfranchises minority groups. Indeed, as
227. See Evelyn Atkinson, Abnormal Persons or Embedded Individuals?: Tracing the
Development of Informed Consent Regulations for Abortion, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 617,
664 (2011) (“Building off a tradition that saw mental health as commensurate with ability to
mother, [Planned Parenthood v. Casey] meant that the state’s interest in women’s health
aligned with its interest in the fetus, disrupting Roe’s purported equipoise between liberty and
fetal life.”).
228. See also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272 (1977)
(“Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who
are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as human beings who are
capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived.”).
229. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2004 (2010) (“Emotion floods careful, stagewise reasoning in a tidal
wave of affect; its association with particulars sweeps decisionmakers from their impersonal,
Archimedean pedestal.”). See generally R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to
Freedom of Speech, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 429, 430 (2003) (explaining that the law generally
prefers to avoid questions of emotion).
230. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570
(5th Cir. 2012).
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Justice Jackson opined, limiting freedom of thought in this manner
“achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”231 The right against
non-rational government-compelled perception should, therefore, be
recognized as an essential corollary to the First Amendment, protecting
the freedoms of thought, belief, and decision-making—the foundational
freedoms of American life.
The goblins are there; they may return. But Americans must be left
to perceive them on their own terms.
*

Peter Ferony

231. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
J.D., Western New England University, 2013. This Note is dedicated to my father,
Thomas Ferony.
*
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245

FERONY FINAL 51313.DOC

246

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:205

WARNING:

Cigarettes cause cancer.

WARNING:

Cigarettes
cause strokes
and heart
disease.
~ 1-800-QUIT-NOW
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WARNING:
Tobacco smoke
causes fatal
lung disease
in nonsmokers.

WARNING:

Quitting
smoking
now greatly
reduces
serious
risks to
your hen.
•
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